In the proxy war launched by the ISI in the State in 1989, the operating principle was "hit and run", the aim being to create demoralisation in the Indian security forces and the civilian population by inflicting large casualties on them. "Liberation" and occupation of territory was not the immediate objective.

The ISI had calculated that if it kept the Indian security forces bleeding, political and public opinion in India would ultimately realise the futility of holding on to the State. The proxy invasion plan of Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Pervez Musharraf, changed the operating principle to one of "occupy and hit", the aim being to set up a bridgehead by occupying the ridges in the Kargil sector left unguarded by the Indian army during winter and thereafter spread the area under occupation each winter by taking advantage of its logistic difficulties.

The role of the Pakistan army became primary in this operation and that of the ISI and the militant-cum-terrorist groups secondary. The proxy invasion plan having failed partly due to the vigorous operations of the Indian army and Air Force and partly due to international pressure on Pakistan, Islamabad has now reverted back to the earlier operating principle of "hit and run", with the primary role once again being assumed by the ISI and its surrogates in the State.

rest of the article is at http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper68.html - http://www.saag.org/archiveindex1.html#paper68

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