Are we to allow Pakistan to continue to train new armies for invasion and to allow its territory to be used as a base for these attacks? The obvious course of action is to strike at these concentrations and lines of communications in Pakistan territory. From a military point of view this would be the most effective step. We have refrained from taking it because of political considerations. We shall have to reconsider this position because a continuation of the present situation is intolerable. If Pakistan is not prepared to help in putting an end to this war or even to try to withdraw these invaders then we should help ourselves, even by crossing some part of Pakistan territory and hitting at their concentrations. This involves a risk of war with Pakistan. We wish to avoid war, but it is merely deluding ourselves to imagine that we are avoiding war so long as the present operations are continuing on either side.

Thus spoke Nehru, India's first prime minister!

When? On December 20, 1947, eleven days before the Kashmir issue was referred to the United Nations. Eleven days which turned out to be momentous for India's future. Is it not strange that today, 55 years later, similar circumstances have come to haunt the present prime minister?

At this point in time, it is useful to remember the role of Great Britain, particularly of Lord Mountbatten, to understand how Albion has been single-handedly responsible for the Kashmir imbroglio. For this, it is necessary to go back to a year before the British left the jewel of their empire.

In 1946-47 they were perhaps ready to depart, but not to lose their influence in Asia and the world. For the past two centuries, the defence of their empire had been centred on the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean [ known as the British lake ]. The British Empire, born from a trading company, was basically a sea-empire. This was brilliantly demonstrated by K M Panikkar, the historian [ unfortunately turned diplomat ] in his famous book, Asia and the Western Dominance . But at the beginning of the 20th century, two new factors appeared on the strategic scene: one was aviation [ whose role was masterfully demonstrated by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour in 1941 ] and petrol [ and therefore the importance of Middle East .

When the British chiefs of staff were ordered to submit a report on the strategic consequences of their departure from the subcontinent, all the generals agreed that Pakistan was the more important of the two future dominions, because of the possibility of installing air bases in the north of the country [ to control Russia ] and naval bases opening to the Arabian Sea in the south. A brotherly contact with the Muslim states in the Middle East was an added bonus.

Another argument, which made Pakistan more reliable, was that Mohammed Ali Jinnah was extremely keen to remain in the Commonwealth while the Indian National Congress could not make up its mind. Jinnah once forcefully told Mountbatten: "You can't kick us out.'

The dies were cast in May 1947 when the chiefs of staff reported: "From the strategic point of view there were overwhelming arguments in favour of West Pakistan remaining within the Commonwealth, namely that we should obtain important strategic facilities..."

Subsequently this policy was implemented, partly with the unknowing [ not to say foolish ] collaboration of the Congress. When the time of independence came and Jinnah insisted on becoming the first governor general of Pakistan [ London had thought Mountbatten could be the governor general of both dominions ], the Congress offered the job in India to the viscount.

rest of the article is at http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/28claude.htm

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