I asked VIGIL a few days ago what exactly what was sought to be achieved through this seminar. They told me that whatever thoughts finally emerge as practicable, workable aspects of a possible solution - they would be transmitted to Delhi. And they would be useful for any authority in Delhi, which takes up the work of negotiating the Kashmir problem with the other parties.

Ultimately it has to be solved only by negotiations. So at that stage, what are the inputs for these parties from our side? This is what I understood to be the purpose of today's seminar. If this can be achieved, this seminar would indeed have been purposeful.

There are some points, which I consider to be crucial when a state of negotiations is reached. Ultimately the Kashmir problem, which has existed with us for fifty years, has to be solved only by negotiations.

Nobody advocates a wholesale war on this issue. It may be thrust upon this nation by a situation, but we are not going to advocate war as a matter of policy. If we are agreed that there is to be a solution only through negotiations, then the one thing we must all grant is that there must be some giving up. There must be some flexibility of approach, which means readiness for some kind of compromise. If we start the negotiations by assuming extreme positions, it follows there can be no meaningful negotiation on the issue. There are some areas on which we may have to agree to give up a stand, which we had previously taken. This is a must for any negotiation because no negotiation can be advantageous only for one side.

What are the areas, which the Indian State would consider non-negotiable and what are those that are negotiable?

I believe there are some aspects, which cannot be compromised at all. I would like the seminar to have this aspect in mind and define those issues that are open for negotiation and those that are not. A kind of flexible approach is necessary to make this happen.

I will first take the Line of Control.

The present LOC is different from the first LOC evolved in 1949. It is not the same LOC. In fact, the first LOC came into existence in 1949 when the first attack by Pakistani intruders in 1947 was repulsed and a LOC was demarcated. This changed again in '65 when the LOC that came into force was advantageous to Pakistan, because we gave up more than we needed to have given up. And then there was the decisive war of 1971. We regained some of our lost advantage and formed another LOC after the war. In '99, Pakistan tried to regain some of the territory it was forced to give up in '71. The wars between India and Pakistan have always been in part about the control of the LOC. It is for us to consider how best at the time of negotiation with Pakistan, whatever may be the LOC at present, we ensure that it should be demarcated in a way that India does not lose the advantage she has had for centuries.

Here I would like to draw your attention to Ram Jethmalani's article, which appeared in one of the leading English dailies not long ago, where he gave some solutions; one of which was that this LOC must be finally accepted as the international boundary and be done with that; but there is a vast section of our people which asks how can we give up territory. Therefore this is a matter of judgement.

Before I proceed further, I would like us all to consider two things. If you have all noticed, the issues we will be discussing in the forenoon, they all refer to history - the question of civlization, nation state evolution, and so on; in a sense the morning issues are all emotive issues. The afternoon issues are issues dealing with the ground reality situation. The ground reality in Kashmir has a political dimension to it, an administrative dimension, and various other managerial dimensions. There are no emotions involved in these dimensions. Ground reality is reality - a factual account of what prevails in Kashmir today. So when we try to evolve our solution let us not spend too much time on emotional issues. Emotional issues are good only for rhetoric. It will whip up emotions, which is alright in public meetings. But when we come to the negotiating table, we have to deal only with ground realities. Therefore when we negotiate, we should give up emotions. So my earnest and humble submission is, let this seminar devote more time to ground realities than emotional aspects.

If we are all agreed that the path of negotiations is the only way to resolve the problem in Jammu and Kashmir, the question arises, with whom do we negotiate. With Pakistan? Keep out Pakistan and negotiate only with Kashmiris? Now we also have this Track II diplomacy. That is an issue on which we may have to bring up specific points. For us to say we will not negotiate with Pakistan, and that it is just a local, domestic problem may be unrealistic to say the least. In my opinion, that would not help. Ground reality demands that we involve Pakistan in our negotiations. Were we to deal with it emotionally, we would say Pakistan is the offender here and that it had no locus standii to decide anything at all about J&K.

The second point that I would like us all to consider is that this issue should not be treated as a Hindu - Muslim problem. It is not just that alone. It is a problem, which concerns India as a nation - which concerns the security of this nation. It just happens that the Kashmiris are Muslims by religion. It is a security risk concerning the entire nation, which is secular. Let us not deal with it as a Hindu - Muslim problem and go on injecting emotions into the problem. But it is true that there is a Hindu-Muslim dimension to it.

There is one section, which thinks that the solution to the problem should be sought through a referendum. An independent Kashmir is also being seriously considered as a real alternative. I want the seminar to consider these recommendations very seriously. I am firmly of the view that both these recommendations should never be allowed to happen. And I will tell you why. An independent Kashmir, which is not a part of India or Pakistan, means that we will have a soft state right on our borders, with a very weak, non functioning administrative apparatus; and such a soft state, take it from me, will be a fertile ground for international espionage and other anti-India activities. This has happened again and again with soft borders. We have seen that problem before Sikkim became a part of India. We had seen all that happened there - Kalimpong, center for international smugglers. Espionage and arms smuggling and things like that cut across political barriers. That is a serious risk to our country and therefore that should not be allowed to happen. The seminar should deal with it seriously and not allow anybody to say anything they please in the press and we should not let such opinions go unchallenged.

Now let's take up the question of terrorism. And once again, let us not confuse the issue by linking it only with Muslim terrorism. It is not Islamic terrorism alone. Terrorism entered the country. It so happened that it entered via the Muslim path. Terrorism poses a major threat to the country. If you deal with it softly you are increasing the risk to the country's very status - its security and integrity. I cannot but condemn the Government's ill-advised repeal of TADA, a wholesale repeal without an alternative. I don't hold any brief for TADA as such. It was a draconian law. Politically it became convenient for the Government to say it was withdrawing TADA. Now we have a vacuum and don't have any law to deal with terrorism. You must have a proper legislation. Several other countries are going ahead with rules to tackle terrorism. There is no meaning having a pact with the U.S. and with Israel or various other countries to fight terrorism when your own armory to deal with it in your country is empty. So a law to replace TADA immediately, is a must.

There is another recommendation made by large sections of people outside the state of J&K, as the first and most important step towards a solution - to scrap Article 370 . Let's look at this recommendation objectively. When Article 370 was introduced in the Constitution, the Constitution itself stated that it was a temporary measure.

But unfortunately, this Art. 370, instead of being scrapped in due course, gave birth to

• Art. 371 A, special status for Nagaland,

• Art. 371 B, special status for Assam,

• Art. 371 C special status for Manipur,

• Art. 371 D&E, special status for Telangana,

• Art. 371 F for Sikkim

• and so on.

So many similar articles have come into this Constitution, to all these areas. What is the purpose of isolating merely Article 370 now? If you want to scrap Article 370, scrap them all together, at the same time. If you talk of Article 370 alone you will not be heard. Is there a rationale for any of them at all? If we fail to do that, and continue to speak of Article 370 alone, we are not being rational, we are being sectarian.

I would like the speakers to take note of the fact that after the Emergency, when the Janata Government came to power in 1977, they amended the Constitution. Now the point is this. In its present form, Article 352 relating to imposition of Emergency, states that Emergency can be declared even in a part of the country. I don't know whether there is any serious thinking in Delhi about whether the Government can declare emergency in a certain affected area, or border and so on. Nobody seems to have done any work on this. I am just pushing this idea. So that we are able to deal with the situation effectively. Our Constitution provides for even martial law.

A little while earlier I said don't bring in the emotional issues but deal with ground realities alone. I had a reason to make that point. At the time of the Chinese aggression, Pandit Nehru remarked that we should not make so much of the dispute over the area along which the Mcmohan line should be demarcated because as he said "not a blade of grass grows there". These were the very words he used. He was pilloried for that statement, because he made it an emotional issue, which clouded his judgement. This is what is happening today with regard to the problem in J&K too.

Is any national party ready to come forward boldly and say, "this is our understanding of the problem and this is our stand on Kashmir". Are they ready to make the commitment to fulfill their plan of action when they come to power? No, they would like to keep it open. This allows them the liberty to criticize any move the Government may make to solve the problem. They may not do anything different when they are in power, but keeping everything open ended allows them to play the game from both ends. This is the malady.

We should evolve a national approach towards this problem, an approach, which should be beyond narrow politics. It is a national problem and we must deal with it as such.

All materials on this website are © 2000-2010

Printer Friendly Format

Search this website

top