General of irrelevant ideas

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25th May 2005

Wilson John

Should we take the Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf's new Kashmir formula seriously? To arrive at a reasonable answer, we must first dissect, clinically if possible, his statement at the concluding session of the conference on 'South Asian Parliament: Evolving South Asian Fraternity' organised by the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) at Islamabad on May 20.

The General made five clear points. First, the borders are irrelevant. Second, demilitarise the region. Third, solution to Kashmir is not along religious lines but along regional and people's basis. Fourth, self- governance. Fifth, a solution has to be discovered soon enough.

The first three points have to be looked at collectively. A 700-km long LoC marks much of the conflict zone which, in the past half-a-century, has witnessed at least four wars. The possibility of another is never far despite the present bon homie. India has maintained that it was not willing to re-draw borders. Pakistan's response has been that it will not accept LoC as a permanent border. Therefore, says President Musharraf, "ultimately, the solution lies in the formulation of making boundaries irrelevant".

He did not elaborate on the point this time, probably because he had done it in detail last year when he earmarked seven areas in the region on the basis of "local culture" and "demographic composition" and suggested demilitarisation of the identified areas. The use of or reference to the word "religion" was avoided. The areas earmarked were: POK and Northern Areas on Pakistan's side; Jammu (Hindu majority); Dodha-Rajori (Muslim majority), Ladakh (Buddhist), Kargil-Drass (Shia), and the Kashmir valley (80-90 per cent Muslim majority), on the Indian side.

The LoC runs through almost the entire earmarked area, denoting a de facto border. The only way to make this border "irrelevant" is to withdraw the troops from either side of the border. This raises a fundamental question. If troops are withdrawn from either side of the LoC, what will mark the border between India and Pakistan? If borders are made "irrelevant" as President Musharraf seems to be suggesting, whose sovereignty will be enforceable in the region? Does it mean that President Musharraf will have the authority to enforce Pakistani laws on this region? Will that also mean that residents of this designated area can opt either for a Pakistani citizenship or Indian or both? And what would happen in times of conflict? Where will the troops position themselves? These are some of the questions which need to be addressed before hand.

At the heart of these questions over the remaking of borders (which is what it is, whether President Musharraf agrees or not) is the mutual distrust. Pakistan and India have a long way to go before creating a sense of trust in each other's moves. History cannot be forgotten in fleeting moments of geniality which might be as fake as General Musharraf's sudden affection for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The history of two neighbours is filled with bitterness, rancour, distrust and treachery.

We can, and should, certainly look beyond the bitter lessons of history. We can think of new ways to forge alliances, create stakes, involve people, forget politics and encourage trade. But the best way to learn from history is to identify the reasons for the bitterness and hatred and attempt either to resolve them or work around them. The single cause of conflict between the two countries is the Pakistani military establishment.

Driven solely by obsessive political ambition, the Army has, over the past 50 years, created an imaginary adversary in India - an ugly demon to mislead its people into impoverishment. The Pakistani Army has damaged the nation more than any other institution. The people of Pakistan are acutely aware of it and are therefore making a desperate attempt to establish a bridge of friendship bypassing Rawalpindi. But this bridge has several structural flaws, the biggest of them being the primacy of the Pakistani Army in politics. This will have to change.

Before talking about Kashmir (another imagined dispute), borders and Siachen, Pakistan must become truly democratic. It will have to keep the Army confined to Rawalpindi. Perhaps General Musharraf has overlooked another fact. If he were to demilitarise the areas identified by him, the military will have to be replaced by the civilian and political establishment. This will require a robust political system which, unfortunately, does not exist in Pakistan.

President Musharraf is not even sure of the longevity of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam, the majority party which he had cobbled together at the time of the October 2002 elections. Two-and-a-half years down the line, he has changed the Prime Minister thrice and might do it again couple of times before the next elections in 2007. At home, he is desperately trying to woo various factions of different political parties, which at several points of time have been his vehement opponents but are willing to enjoy the spoils of power if given a chance. This could also mean an early election in Pakistan, a gamble which President Musharraf might be willing to take to strengthen his position for another decade.

President Musharraf's attempt to take a lead on Kashmir has to be read with his domestic compulsions. He does not stand a chance to remain in power if he loses out on Kashmir. There is already a section in Pakistan led by the vociferous but ineffective Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, which has dubbed the President's moves on Kashmir as a "u-turn" on Pakistan's traditional Kashmir policy.

Although there are no visible signs of any adverse reactions in the Army, it is safe to presume that there will be murmurs of protest in the middle and junior ranks besides the men. There are enough straws in the wind to indicate such an eventuality. The involvement of certain Pakistani Air Force personnel in the assassination attempts on President Musharraf and the crackdown on several junior Army officers for aiding the Taliban last year are two clear indicators that all is not well within the military establishment.

There is, in fact, a real possibility of such dissension increasing in the wake of the Army's continued involvement in Waziristan and Balochistan operations and the ongoing wave of anger in the Islamic countries over the Bagram and Guantanamo abuses by American forces.

The reason for his desperation to find a solution, and that too within a short period (three months), lies within these developments. But then, that is Mr Musharraf's desperation and need. Issues of critical importance to two nations cannot be held hostage to a military dictator gearing up for an electoral battle or fighting for survival. Therefore, the suggestions about "irrelevant borders", demilitarisation and a solution on regional basis for Kashmir will have to wait till both the countries find a way to trust each other.

As for self-governance in Kashmir, it is an issue which is best left to the people of Kashmir to decide. And they have, in favour of the Indian Constitution by taking part in the Assembly elections in 2002. President Musharraf, who thinks like a superannuated General, will have to bid his time.

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