Years of violence, a credible election, several efforts at peace, and still no end in sight to the J&K imbroglio. Much of this has to do with the nature of the 'struggle' in J&K. Revival of militancy in J&K at the end of 1989 owed a great deal to external instigation. The first wave involved Kashmiri outfits like the JKLF which had their sights set on 'Azadi'. The second wave beginning 1992, found Pakistan-sponsored militant outfits like the Hizb- ul-Mujahideen in the vanguard and the marginalising of indigenous Kashmiri outfits. Later, Pan-Islamist outfits such as the Lashker-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul- Mujahideen and the Jaish-e- Mohamad gained in prominence, and Islamist causes and 'jehad' soon overshadowed local grievances.

2. After 13 years of 'mindless' violence and the loss of nearly 40,000 lives, including that of several hundreds of Security Force personnel, belief in the possibility of peace is beginning to recede. The mood in J&K today is sombre, tinged with a great deal of sadness, though the aspect of fear is less overwhelming. Life goes on, but everyone is aware that a bomb could explode or an IED could cause havoc in any bus, roadside dhaba or public place at any time. The Police and Security Forces are everywhere, guarding not only vital installations but also other places where people congregate.

3. A vast majority of Kashmiris in J&K oppose the present 'covert' war. They believe that foreign militants and Pakistan have damaged the 'Kashmiri cause'. An independent survey (carried out on behalf of MORI many weeks prior to elections in J&K) indicated that 86% want an end to militancy, and infiltration across the Line of Control to stop. Over 60% of the population in J&K wished to remain with India. A large percentage felt that 'Kashmiriyat' was being undermined as a result of the 'proxy' conflict.

4. Disillusionment is the dominant sentiment in J&K. Equally, there is anger that a free and fair election and a new PDP- Congress Government, has not led to diminution in levels of violence. The daily tally of terrorists targetting innocents - including harmless individuals such as school teachers, women and children under 10 - is causing a great deal of anguish. Terrorisation of young women in the name of a 'burqa campaign' adds to the pain already felt by random killings. Fear exists that having failed to disrupt the elections, terrorists may now indulge in 'mega terror'. The terrorist attack on the Raghunath Temple in Jammu (November 2002) is seen as a precursor of this.

5. Mixed with this are deep-seated feelings of betrayal - with the international community for not denouncing violence in J&K as unadulterated terrorism and reining in Pakistan; with the Central and State Governments for not doing enough to reduce violence; and with the political class for not finding innovative ways to defuse the situation.

6. The sense of betrayal is perhaps maximum with the political leadership. Ire at the ongoing violence is mainly directed at the leaders for failing to effectively mobilise people in favour of peace and secular ideals. Many feel that the new PDP-Congress dispensation in Srinagar is not serious about clamping down on hardline outfits, and is obsessed with providing the 'healing touch'. Concerns are expressed that the PDP could well become 'dupes' of those sections within the coalition having close ties with separatist outfits. There is demoralisation that the Congress is not playing its appointed role, and is becoming a 'bit player' on the margins of the coalition in such matters.

7. A major lacuna is the absence of a viable strategy. Reconciling the different strands that have led to the current situation in J&K is no easy task. Providing a military or security answer to a problem that cries out for political solution is not enough, even if 'jehadi outfits' do not observe any 'red lines'.

8. One hope viz. that US commitment to battle terrorism world- wide would put curbs on Pakistan's support to terrorist outfits operating inside J&K, has already been extinguished. Another, that Musharraf would be disgraced by virtue of holding a 'farce' of an election, has not materialised. There is now even less pressure on Musharraf to alter his ways or reform his methods. Worse, with the US unwilling to read the riot act to him, President Musharraf has no need to endorse that 'terrorism is not acceptable currency'.

9. What, therefore, are the options available to India? After all the loss of lives and the destruction caused by a decade and more of violence, mere change of incumbency in Srinagar may not be enough. The PDP-Congress Coalition Government will need to do much more than merely govern. They will be required to deliver on the larger political concerns, without which real improvements are not possible. Arm-chair experts often refer to the need for India to make a bold gesture to end the impasse in J&K. No one has yet come up with a concept which, even if it does not meet with total acceptability of all concerned, atleast has the merit of the Least Common Denominator of opposition.

10. Western think-tanks achieve self-fulfillment, by indulging in creative map-making. They ignore the fact that any such step - even if possible - involves shifting people and populations. It overlooks the miseries caused by large movements across new borders. It ignores a fact of history i.e. no nation under attack from terrorists can be seen to unilaterally make substantial concessions. It would be tantamount to appeasement. It would invite the risk of more such attacks in the expectation of securing still more gains. Escalating violence is already making it difficult for voices of moderation to be heard. Hardliners in India are even beginning to see a silver lining in the fact that the growing cost of supporting violence in J&K would further wreck Pakistan's economy, scare off foreign investment, and hasten the day when Pakistan becomes a failed State.

11. Pakistan lives in the hope that by resorting to 'proxy war' it can force international intervention. Also that, such intervention would produce a favourable settlement. This is a vain hope, even with Musharraf's periodic attempts at nuclear sabre-rattling. The preponderance of opinion today in the West is for India and Pakistan to settle the issue bilaterally. No one is interested in getting embroiled in messy international mediation. The most they are willing to consider is to agree to use their 'good offices' if both India and Pakistan agree. Since India has set its face against any third party mediation, this is clearly a non-starter.

12. Meantime, the 'peace offensive' seems to have stalled. The plethora of Committees that exist are making little headway. Dy.Prime Minister, L.K.Advani recently committed the Centre to holding a dialogue with 'elected representatives and others' to resolve the crisis in J&K. Though widely welcomed, there is little to enthuse over. Moving negotiations from the procedural to the substantive will prove a Herculean task. A major impediment is the Hurriyat - at once a divided house and hamstrung in acting independently - because of Pakistan's strangle-hold. Moderates like the young Mirwaiz are in a minority within the Hurriyat and unable to make it more responsive. However, not involving the Hurriyat will invite the accusation that peace initiatives are a mere charade.

13. Pinning hopes on the Kashmir Committee headed by Ram Jethmalani may also be unduly optimistic. Its efforts to bring about a modus vivendi between mainstream and separatist forces in J&K, despite several rounds of dialogue have come to naught. A tentative move to open channels of communication between representatives of the Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir - with prominent members in both countries acting as facilitators - also has gone nowhere. The Kashmir quagmire thus remains where it was. New thinking is needed. Without this, merely repeating old mantras or packaging previously tried out methods can be a recipe for failure.

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