Delhi's political (and administrative) hierarchy seems finally - and rather belatedly - coming to grips with the nitty-gritty of how to end the longest-running conflict in this part of the world. Naga insurgency - often referred to as the mother of all insurgencies pre-dates India's independence, but Delhi preferred so far to 'circle the wagon', allowing things to simmer rather than find a 'political solution'. Five decades on, the ranks of active secessionist outfits in the region have greatly swelled, aggravating problems here.

2. Pinning too much hope on the current round of talks to end the imbroglio has been a mistake. The visit of the NSCN(I/M) Chairman and General Secretary, their first to India in nearly four decades, had all the trappings of a State visit, including substantive level talks with the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Defence Minister and Leader of the Opposition, accompanied by detailed press briefings each day. Statements intended to fuel the 'feel-good factor' regularly appeared viz. the meeting with the Prime Minister (January 9) ended on a 'positive note', the talks were proceeding in the right direction, the approach of both sides was 'mature and realistic', there was appreciation from the NSCN for the Prime Minister's 'sincerity' in finding a solution, and that a 'better understanding of the problems existed now'. The impression sought to be conveyed was that a solution was near, if not imminent. The joint communique at the end of the talks with merely a promise to continue the talks clearly belies these hopes.

3. It was in any case highly premature to view the visit of the two NSCN(I/M) leaders as 'history in the making'. The camaraderie displayed masked serious differences that exist on crucial issues. The 'soft image' presented by the two leaders - and specially Muivah - was highly beguiling. Those familiar with the latter's track record as a prominent member of the 'China- returned gangs' during the '50s and the '60s, believe it smacked of chicanery. Both Muivah and Swu had made periodic visits to Tibet - and more than one visit to China - during those years, and been trained and assisted by China when Beijing was deeply involved in 'wars of national liberation'. The authorities would do well not to be taken in by their assurances.

4. For their part, the two leaders were nothing if not consistent. Their 'siren song' was the 'uniqueness' of Nagaland's history and its 'special circumstances' - which they claimed the Government is only now beginning to understand and comprehend. No hint was given of their having resiled - even slightly - from their stated demand of many years - dating back to Phizo in the Fifties - of 'national self-determination' and the need for Nagaland to maintain its separate identity outside the Indian Union. In this respect, they appear to have made even fewer concessions than the LTTE in Sri Lanka made to the Norwegian mediators. LTTE leader, Prabhakaran, was atleast willing to state in public (November 2002) that only if their demand for regional self-rule is rejected would they seek the alternative of seceding and forming an independent State.

5. It is to the credit of the two leaders that they made no attempt to obfuscate key issues. They did not confuse matters by talking of different forms of federalism. They did not harp on different types of distribution of power. They candidly reiterated their commitment to the idea of 'Naga sovereignty'. Also that 'outsiders' had no role in this.

6. Calling for greater circumspection given their past history, and list of perfidies whenever constitutional issues have cropped up or when the format of a future political framework was discussed, would thus appear pragmatic. The longstanding objective of the NSCN has always been to extend its administration to the entire region that it perceives as the 'Naga Homeland'. This incorporates substantial tracts of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, apart from Nagaland. Neither ceding of territory, affecting the territorial integrity of the Indian nation, nor redrawing of the boundaries of various States in the North East, is feasible or desirable. The 'Nagalim' or 'Naga Homeland' demand is a virtual powder-keg and the North East could explode if this is seriously considered. The premise on which it is based is faulty - Manipur, for example, has Nagas, Meiteis, Kukis, Peiteis and a host of other communities as well.

7. It is important that the 'price of peace' not be too heavy. It must not also be perceived as if India is seeking peace at any cost. The NSCN(I/M)'s agenda is hardly a hidden one, and Indian negotiators need not go overboard on the plea of 'confidence building'. Naga 'secessionary nationalism' needs to be handled with deftness. Falling over backwards to placate the NSCN must be avoided. Muivah and Swu cannot be allowed to dictate terms.

8. What NSCN(I/M) cadres inside Nagaland are doing should be an eye opener. Violent incidents have come down, but extortions continues at an alarming rate. Internecine warfare for dominance has broken out between the NSCN(I/M) and the NSCN(K). Other parts of the North East are now beginning to be affected. The kind of 'parallel talks' held by Muivah and Swu, with groups such as the National Peoples' Movement for Human Rights, the Naga Students Federation, and the Naga Mothers Association among others, during their visit also sends wrong signals.

9. The real display of skill would have been to manage the talks in such a manner that democratic forces, rather than insurgent elements, emerge victorious. The North East with over 200 recognised tribes speaking more than 250 dialects is a veritable melting-pot of tribal conflicts and loyalties. In response to the political, social and economic aspirations of different tribal groups many demands had previously been considered and acted upon. The incorporation of the Sixth Schedule in the Indian Constitution is one. The inclusion of the new Articles 371A, 371B, 371C, 371G, 371H, as well as the Fifty Sixth and Fifty Seventh Amendments relating to Nagaland and other States in the region were other significant changes effected. If the Centre has to be faulted, it cannot be for not being responsive but for appearing too willing at times to amend the Constitution for buying peace. Hopefully this time around parochial forces will not be allowed to gain at the expense of national interest.

10. The NSCN(I/M) cannot claim to speak for the Nagas as a whole since large segments do not owe allegiance to it. Thus its claim to impose its will on the region in the name of a 'Naga Homeland' can hardly stand scrutiny. We must also guard against the possibility, as on previous occasions, that after an understanding had been reached with moderate leaders within the parameters of the Indian Constitution - splinter militant factions refuse to abide by the agreement. The Shillong Accord of 1975 was a perfect example of this, when the Muivah-Isak Swu duo along with some others refused to accept the Accord, insisted on pursuing a militant course, and formed the NSCN in 1980.

11. Since 1964, elections have been held regularly in Nagaland, and the Nagas control their own destiny. There is no substance left in the original demand - made 47 years ago when declaring 'Independence' and setting up a 'Naga Federal Government' - of the need to protect their cultural and ethnic identity. The vast majority of the Nagas are enlightened enough to accept the present situation and the NSCN(I/M) should not be allowed to upset the apple-cart. It may also be a matter of interest to note that serious negotiations with Laldenga and the Mizo National Front to end the two decade long Mizo insurgency (1966-1986) occurred only after Laldenga had accepted two basic conditions which have since become a sine qua non for all negotiations between Government and insurgents. First, the acceptance of the framework of the Indian Constitution. Second, the eschewal of violence. These salutary principles remain eminently valid today.

All materials on this website are © 2000-2010

Printer Friendly Format

Search this website

top