The Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security (held a little over a week ago) has become something of a hardy annual. Prior to this meeting, a Conference of Chief Secretaries/Directors General of Police had taken place during January. The two events signify the importance currently being attached to, and the concerns felt, about the internal security situation. Notwithstanding this, neither Conference came up with any clear cut recommendations on how to deal with the situation.

2. Addressing the Conference (February 8), Prime Minister Vajpayee referred to the several threats the nation faced, including communal violence and left-wing extremism, but reserving his strongest words for the threat posed by terrorism to 'national security, national unity and integrity'. The Prime Minister pronounced that the 'most disconcerting aspect of this was that terrorism is being sponsored, supported and funded by Pakistan' as a matter of State policy.

3. The Conference declined to shift away from conventional wisdom. The participants preferred the 'beaten path' to experimenting with new ideas to deal with the myriad threats. The need to strengthen secularism and take action against fundamentalist organisations was mentioned. 'Good governance' was brought in as a useful tool to deal with internal security issues. The J&K and Kerala Chief Ministers, even delivered homilies on good governance - the former affirming its importance in States perennially affected by terrorism, and the latter stating that a 'properly run' democracy could be an effective bulwark against internal security problems. The meeting turned down the idea of setting up a Central Law Enforcement Agency.

4. The Chief Minister's conclave is the apex forum of the highest ranking policy makers from around the country. Despite near-total agreement about the seriousness of the internal situation, their inability to suggest bold measures is adequate commentary on the existing state of affairs. It could have recommended radical improvements and reforms , as well as fresh initiatives , in the domain of national security management. This was the moment to have made a bold statement of our 'intent and purpose'. This was the right opportunity to display much needed unity of purpose on security issues. This was the occasion to underline the spirit of national solidarity and of a strengthened national resolve to fight internal (as also external) enemies. None of this was, however, in evidence.

5. Had the meeting brought greater clarity to how the various internal security problems , including terrorism, left-wing extremism and other kinds of aggravated militancy , were being dealt with, it would have rendered a signal service to the nation. If it had spelt out the specific steps required to deal with today's sectarian violence, this would have gone a considerable way in defusing communal polarisation. Had a consensus been forged on how to handle vexed and contentious issues such as taking action against militants and terrorists holed up inside a place of worship, the meeting would have more than served its purpose. Provision of suitable guidelines to the Security Forces , based on the experience of other countries like the UK where the Police had very recently entered a place of worship to arrest a group of terrorists linked to the discovery of a deadly toxin 'Ricin' , would also have been very helpful to the law and order forces. It would have helped to blunt some of the criticism levelled against them by Human Rights and Civil Liberties groups.

6. In the year 2000, two Expert committees on Internal Security and Intelligence were set up by the Group of Ministers, as a sequel to the Kargil Inquiry Committee Report. The reports of these Committees provide an useful template for further elaboration at conclaves of this kind. High level Conferences of Chief Ministers , or for that matter of Chief Secretaries/Directors General of Police , however, seldom surf anything other than their own horizons. A considerable wealth of information that is available thus tends to be ignored, and end up as archival material.

7. Two years is not a long time in the history of a nation, but given the fast evolving internal security scenario two years is beginning to look like an eternity. It might hence be worthwhile to take a fresh look at, and update, some of the steps outlined in the GOM reports on Intelligence and Internal Security. The important thing to realise is that pressures are intensifying at tremendous speed. Requirements and capabilities hence need to be constantly fine-tunned so as to meet the needs of the situation.

8. Ideally , and in an academic sense , intelligence requirements reflect the prioritised needs of security. This pre?supposes the existence of a 'strategic national security policy vision' , something which looks great on paper, but is a nightmare to delineate. It envisages possessing an intelligence base that is both extensive and has depth. To create such a base, an intelligence agency would need to have major insights into the intentions and plans of antagonistic forces; be able to properly assess and analyse the diverse and complex strands of militancy; monitor all manner of political, economic and social tensions etc.

9. Two among the more significant recommendations of the Task Force on Intelligence (2000), pertained to the setting up of a Multi-Agency Centre for Counter Terrorism and the constitution of a Joint Task Force on Intelligence. The former was expected to be the focal point for all intelligence issues relating to terrorism, pooling together disparate intelligence resources as also providing for synergistic collection and analysis of critical problems. It was to be truly Multi-Agency, with representation from all concerned agencies. It was also to have an operational responsibility instead of being merely a repository for information. We have a Multi-Agency Centre that exists in an embryonic form today, but it falls well short of the ideal. The increasing terrorist threat, meantime, and the growing numbers of terrorist outfits, necessitate some new thinking. One proposal which could be actively considered is for having short- term highly focussed ad hoc Task Forces to assist the Multi- Agency Centre to meet its operational obligations.

10. The Joint Task Force on Intelligence was another seminal concept, and was intended to improve and streamline the State Intelligence and State Special Branches. It was expected to help mainly in enhancing their clandestine human and technical intelligence capabilities. In addition, it would help provide a common countrywide denominator to determine intelligence priorities and needs. None of this has happened as yet. With emerging security problems, new breakthroughs have become necessary. For instance, the Co-ordination Committee mechanism to deal with Naxalite violence has clearly outlived its utility. The idea of having intelligence operations jointly run by a State and Central Intelligence may hence need to be seriously considered. There is a precedent for this. In the early '70s, the Intelligence Bureau and a State intelligence unit had co- ordinated their efforts to run a joint ' highly secret ' intelligence operation. The aim was to penetrate the highest levels of the CPI-ML. Today, an effort of this kind has become even more urgent.

11. The role of the National Security Council and the bodies operating under it may also merit a review. The NSC has been in existence for nearly five years, and during this period the National Security Council has seldom had the time to provide consistent high level guidance of the kind required today.

The National Security Adviser has often been left to his own devices even at critical moments. The National Security Advisory Board, due to historical and other reasons, has not been able to discharge this responsibility. It might be useful to contemplate whether a far smaller Committee , comprising both serving personnel and outside experts , should be formed which would remain in constant touch with the National Security Adviser, and through him provide information access to senior policy makers who are members of the National Security Council. This would help in giving the desired direction on intelligence and security matters.

It would inevitably need a strengthening of the National Security Council Secretariat, making it more responsive to the needs of the Intelligence Community as a whole and the National Security Adviser specifically.

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