The opening salvos of the 2004 General Elections have already been fired by the two prime contestants viz. the BJP and the Congress. The BJP virtually 'kicked off' its campaign by holding a meeting of 'select' leaders of the National Democratic Alliance at Delhi on March 30. On the same day, the Congress party held a rally at which it termed the NDA and its Government, as 'corrupt and ineffective', alleged that it was pursuing a 'divisive agenda', and questioned the credentials of its national security strategy. The Congress seemed to think that the time had come for a 'regime change'.

2. The irony is that while both parties are busy sniping at each other, they appear seemingly indifferent to the lengthening shadow of violence over the nation, with violence no longer being concentrated in a few pockets such as the J&K and the North East and enveloping many more areas including the heartland states. If consciousness of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom, it will be futile to expect any new initiative from either stable.

3. Radical remedies are needed to end the impasse in J&K and time is of the essence. Delhi having painted itself into a corner in J&K by repeatedly appealing to Western interlocutors to compel Pakistan to halt cross-border terrorism, now finds the world quietly standing on its head and pressing India to start a dialogue with Pakistan, instead of condemning the aggressor. The security and intelligence agencies have been notching up many a success - the latest being the elimination of Hizbul Operational Chief, Saif-ul-Islam - but no status-quoist strategy can succeed over the long-term. Flexibility and fluidity of response and stark realism are the vital elements of any strategy. For instance, an admission that it was the combined pressure of the US/International Coalition Against Terrorism, the presence of Indian troops on the LoC, and the weather, that had led to a slowing down of infiltration and decline in levels of violence towards the end of 2002, rather than the change of incumbency in Srinagar should be the first step. Even then, the killings had never stopped. During the five month period between November 2002 and March 2003, nearly 900 persons were killed, roughly 15% of whom were security personnel.

4. Next, is to try and discern the diabolical plan behind the recent spurt in selective killings and spectacular 'fidayeen' attacks. Abdul Aziz Mir, the MLA from Pampore was the first to be assassinated after the elections - even before the memory of Abdul Gani Lone's killing had faded. Abdul Majid Dar, former Chief Commander of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was killed in March 2003. The 'fidayeen' attack on the Raghunath temple in Jammu city during November 2002 was the precursor of a series of violent incidents. March 2003, was a particularly sanguinary month - the massacre of 24 Kashmiri pandits at Nadimarg in South Kashmir on March 24, having been preceded on March 13 by the killing of 4 persons in Rajouri; the killing of six persons including a DSP and a Head Constable in Poonch; and an attack on a remote police post in Udhampur district (March 15) in which 13 persons, including 11 policemen were murdered.

5. Cold reasoning needs to replace mushy sentiment if J&K is not to slide out of control, as it almost did in 1990. The actions taking place are not individual acts intended to frustrate attempts to restore normalcy in the State - an argument which the present dispensation in Srinagar trots out at every opportunity. There is a 'grand' design behind the stepped-up violence. Pakistan has upped the ante, taking advantage of an easing of pressures on it due to the pre-occupation of the West with Iraq. Terrorist training camps in Pakistan are overflowing with new recruits intent of waging a 'jehad' in Kashmir. Reliable estimates indicate that nearly 5000 recruits are poised to cross over from Pakistan to supplement the 3000 to 4000 mercenaries already in J&K. Restrictions imposed soon after September 11, 2001, and specifically after January 12, 2002 following Musharraf's promise to crackdown on jehadi outfits, have been totally relaxed. Banned groups or outfits which were designated as terrorist by the international community have, and with the connivance of the ISI, changed labels and it is business as usual. Fund raising has attained new heights. An increase in drug-related funds for terrorist activities in J&K is increasingly evident. Pressure from the ISI has also led to improved coordination amongst militant outfits within the J&K.

6. A more innovative approach is hence needed to face the defining struggle of our generation. The decisions taken at the March 31 officials' meeting at Srinagar appear much too banal and hence unlikely to succeed. Merely deploying more force, talking of a more coordinated approach, or constitution of a special group to review existing macro-strategies will not suffice. Subsequent meetings held at Delhi have also hardly produced any encouraging strategies. Multi-layered terrorism orchestrated by the ISI, and employing jehadi militants as cannon fodder, needs a more cerebral approach.

7. There is no time to lose as the canker is spreading. In Mumbai, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of 'Black Friday 1993', a powerful bomb exploded on a suburban train killing 12 persons (March 13). It was the fourth bomb blast in recent months - Ghatkopar (December 2002), Vile Parle and Mumbai Central (January 2003) being the others. The Mulund blast had its echoes far away in Chennai with the suspected involvement of the Muslim Defence Force, a pro-ISI outfit. In Delhi, on March 14, the police detected six unexploded bombs in the vicinity of the Delhi Railway Station. Mumbai, Delhi and Chennai have witnessed several encounters in recent days featuring terrorist outfits either directly linked to, or associated, with the Lashker-e- Toiba/Jaish-e-Mohamad.

8. This is not all. There are now indications of incipient cooperation between political/religious extremist forces and Organised Crime. This has already manifested itself in the March 27 assassination of former Gujarat Minister, Haren Pandya, and reports indicate the ISI acted as the mid-wife. Separately, the Student Islamic Movement of India has tied up with cadres of the Peoples' War Group in the border areas of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. The PWG in Andhra Pradesh is already on the rampage, attacking targets from Railway Stations to power installations to MNC establishments, in a wide arc from Vizianagaram to Khammam to Nizamabad.

9. The North East has also come alive. The emergence of the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura and the KHNAM in Meghalaya as political entities foretell a great deal of turbulence ahead. The NLFT in Tripura is unlikely to quietly accept the recent electoral verdict there. The NSCN(I/M) and the NSCN(K) are poised for major turf battles in Nagaland, supporting or opposing their favourite political parties. In Assam, a wave of attacks carried out by the ULFA in both Upper and Lower Assam, targeting oil installations such as the Digbhoi refinery and the oil pipeline near Duliajan - as well as the police - is cause for concern.

10. In quite a few other pockets of the country as well the situation now calls for close attention. A bid is being made to revive terrorism in the Punjab. The planning and inspiration is coming from expatriate sources in the West and from Pakistan. In the far South, insular and exclusivist groups have gained a fresh lease of life by forging links with smugglers and the drug mafia. The Southern districts of Tamil Nadu have become a haven for the smuggling of drugs and narcotics to Sri Lanka, and a sizeable part of the profits find their way to militant groups for their activities.

11. The BJP and the Congress hence need to pay more attention to such trends. Their intrinsic potential for widespread violence and mayhem is considerable. Ignoring or overlooking them can have deleterious consequences for the nation. A more realistic approach is hence necessary. Pressure must be exerted on the security and intelligence agencies to formulate innovative strategies and come up with new ideas to meet not only the current, but future, threats.

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