The Iraq war, international terrorism, and the SARS epidemic notwithstanding, Kashmir continues to remain on the radar screen. A little over a fortnight back, Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister, voiced an opinion - that some in India have long held - that India had a 'better case' for a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan than the US had against Iraq. The argument is seductive, at least at first glance, for Pakistan is an acknowledged sponsor of terrorism and its capacity to protect its nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists remains in serious doubt.

2. Yet, few experts in India believe that India would try for a pre-emptive strike. For almost a whole year after the December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament, India had arraigned its forces on the border but displayed commendable restraint in not taking any pro-active step. The latest massacre of 24 Kashmiri pandits in Nadimarg (Pulwama Dist) is unlikely to compel India to resort to 'the doctrine of pre-emption' that lies at the core of current US thinking of how to deal with recalcitrant States. Nevertheless, US officials have been too quick off the mark to disavow any comparison between Iraq and Kashmir. US officialdom's perverse logic also has Pakistan being praised for its 'strong and sustained support' against terrorism, with promises of additional financial assistance for this purpose.

3. India's leaders are acutely conscious of the perils of engaging in any unilateral military action, including air strikes or special operations against 'jehadi' training camps inside PoK or Pakistan. The Prime Minister is the least likely to permit hubris to get the better of pragmatism. Despite the persistent campaign by Pakistani Prime Minister, Mir Jamali, to raise the ante over Kashmir and Lashkar Chief, Hafiz Saeed's provocative utterances that '.killing Hindus was part of their 'jehad' , he has again extended the 'hand of friendship' towards Pakistan.

4. The West has hardly made matters any easier for India. The Bush-Blair joint statement of March 27 suggesting, among other things, a cease-fire and holding of talks between India and Pakistan to reduce tensions, merely rubs salt into long-standing wounds. Violence still casts a long shadow over J&K. Anyone not totally subservient to Pakistani diktats is brutally eliminated - the assassination of Abdul Majid Dar on March 23 this year for proposing a shift away from violent tactics and of Abdul Gani Lone prior to the elections last year are prime examples . This has been further buttressed by yet another wave of ethnic cleansing viz. the March 24 killing of Kashmiri Pandit families.

5 India does not have too many options available - most earlier initiatives having come to naught. Nevertheless, in his Independence Day speech (August 15, 2002), Prime Minister Vajpayee made the promise that talks would be held about the future of J&K after the Assembly elections in that State. A new interlocutor has since been appointed to restart the dialogue process. Few would fault the choice of N.N.Vohra as the interlocutor. The interlocutor has, however, reasons to feel shackled by the kind of constraints being put on him viz. the absence of unfettered discretion on whom to interact with; widespread scepticism about the Centre's intent; too much interference from personalities and groups which is already vitiating the atmosphere and; above all, the scaling up of levels of violence inhibiting a free and fair dialogue. The interlocutor has met with initial set-backs with the All Party Hurriyat Conference and Shabir Shah's Democratic Freedom Party expressing grave doubts about the real purport of his mission.

6. The prevailing culture whenever Kashmir is debated is usually one of profound scepticism or worse. The interlocutor, hence, faces an uphill task, and would do well to heed some of the lessons derived from the prolonged 'Irish Peace Process'. He could begin by identifying 'the Gerry Adams' of the Kashmir peace process - whether it be one of the Hurriyat leaders like the young Mirwaiz, or Shabir Shah or someone else, now that Lone has been eliminated. The defining moment of the interlocutor's mission will be when he is able to transform today's 'untouchable' leader or leaders into an acceptable political leader, in the manner that Gerry Adams made the transition from being a terrorist to a responsible leader of a political party. The Irish peace process clearly demonstrates that there are one or more swivel moments in the history of such negotiations when an unrepentant militant begins to change colour and starts to see himself as a responsible leader capable of engaging in complex negotiations.

7. Securing the acceptance of a militant leader as a politician in the democratic mould is a critical aspect of the negotiations - and one that will be crucial to the success of the dialogue process. Maintaining a certain degree of ambiguity about the leader or the leadership may be inevitable if this has to happen, but if it can be sustained it could prove a great asset. This will, however, demand a large measure of tolerance from the side of the Government, the Security Forces, Intelligence Agencies and the Press. It is not easy for a militant leader to abandon violence and adopt a fully political strategy, and there may well be a requirement from the side of the interlocutor to appreciate - and make concessions for - the surreal absurdity of the transformation of a hated terrorist into a respected public figure.

8. This may not be as bizarre as it seems. The Irish peace process had its 'Gerry Adams', but nearer home we have our 'Laldenga'. In the mid-70s, the Shillong Accord was the outcome of a similar effort in this direction. In the 80s, the TNV leader Bijoy Hrangkwal fitted this prototype. More recently, negotiations with the NSCN(I/M) have been proceeding on these assumptions.

9. The interlocutor would also do well to assess what makes more sense - a change of mind or a change of heart. If the history of the Irish peace process has been properly documented, it would appear that Gerry Adams effected a change of strategy more due to pragmatic calculations than to a crisis of conscience. It is tempting to think that there are parallels with Northern Ireland which apply to J&K today. As in Northern Ireland, it is increasingly clear that armed struggle cannot hope to succeed, even if Pakistan's support to it continues unabated. Nothing that is taking place can possibly compel India to abandon Kashmir just as Britain could not be forced to leave Northern Ireland. India having demonstrated that it was ready to go to any length if it felt its territorial integrity was being threatened should by now have convinced one and all that it would hardly surrender any part of its territory because of the depredations of a handful of terrorist outfits.

10. If the interlocutor has to succeed he may further need the back up of a carefully constructed Track-II initiative, so as to keep certain aspects of the process secret, - not only from the public but also from some of the more intransigent elements among the militants. Manoeuvring 'a conspiratorial organization with a self-righteous imperviousness to the complex realities' as the New York Times puts it, is no mean task and additional hands to the tiller may come in handy.

11. Ultimately, one of the primary aims of the interlocutor should be to bring about a change of image as far as the militant outfits are concerned. They would need to understand the virtue, and the importance, of functioning as a democratically-oriented mass organization, one which can thereafter hope to win significant electoral support. This would not be possible, however, without isolating and marginalizing the more intransigent elements. Above all, if the Security Forces were to achieve a significant break-through by notching up a couple of major successes against 'jehadi outfits' on the pattern of 'Black Thunder' (1988) or 'Hazaratbal' (1993) it might send just the right signal to those negotiating, that real hope lies in extracting concessions through negotiations rather than through violence.

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