Less than a week after the Mumbai blasts, the BSF (August 30) managed to eliminate Gazi Baba, the mastermind behind the December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament in Srinagar. The killing of Gazi Baba has removed an important Jaish-e-Mohamad strategist, who was credited with the ability to weld together diverse terrorist outfits to carry out spectacular strikes. J&K has since been convulsed with a spate of attacks fidayeen and otherwise directed against Security Forces and the Army as well as civilian targets.

2. The rash of incidents during past weeks confirm that terrorist actions are no longer circumscribed by defined boundaries. The audacity displayed by terrorist outfits in launching an attack when the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and other dignitaries were in Srinagar, and the prolonged stand off in Kathua district of Jammu region during the past few days, constitute danger signals. Confirmation of the presence of Jaish- e-Mohamad and Lashker-e-Toiba operatives in the nation's Capital despite the heightened vigilance and reports of lethal weapons being stored in safe houses, adds to this prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty.

3. Legitimate doubts are hence being raised as to whether the authorities can put pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together to provide a coherent picture of terrorist intentions, and whether they possess the capability to deter attacks in the future. A beginning could, however, be perhaps made by taking a fresh look at the role of Pakistan's ISI in all this. The perfidy of the ISI is, no doubt, a hackneyed theme, and has been flogged indiscriminately oftentimes without adequate facts. Nevertheless, there is a seamless thread that connects the several major incidents that have taken place lately which seem to carry the imprint of the ISI. A new probe may, hence, be worthwhile.

4. This kind of a challenge to the monopoly of legitimate power vested in the Indian State has hardly been seen previously. The 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts marked the opening shots in this battle, and the ISI's hand was clearly evident including the harbouring of key figures responsible for the blasts like 'Tiger' Memon. Not so obvious was the role of the ISI in other incidents like the Delhi bomb blasts (in 1996) and the Mumbai explosions of 1997 and 1998. There is little doubt now, of ISI backing for the attack on the American Centre in Kolkata and the Akshardham incident in Gujarat (both in 2002). This year's series of bomb blasts in Mumbai, and the recent explosions in Delhi and Kolkata have a strong ISI flavour. Consequently, the shrill cry of Lashker e Toiba supremo, Hafiz Mohamad Sayeed, that 'all of civilization must clash until Islam is accepted everywhere' has a definite ominous ring to it as far as India is concerned.

5. The concept of a struggle against the 'common enemy of Islam' is deeply embedded in the psyche of radical Islamist 'jehadi' outfits worldwide. In the past, however, with a few notable exceptions, revolutionary Islamist actions were confined to those areas where Islam had a perceived stake Palestine for example. This is now changing, and co terminus with the rise of the Al Qaeda and the non Arab complement among 'jehadis', the prevailing belief appears to be that Islamic groups should not remain hemmed in, and actions need not be restricted to specific areas. In India, the ISI has utilised this doctrine, and by exploiting religious sentiment has fanned fanaticism to create several local cells.

6. Understanding the ISI phenomenon is very necessary. The ISI began patronising Islamic radicals fleeing Afghanistan way back in 1975 following the uprising against President Daud. By 1980, the ISI had under its control a sizeable number of Islamic radicals, many of whom subsequently fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. Inside Pakistan meanwhile, the ISI worked with the Jamaat e Islami. With the establishment of the Taliban in 1994 and its endorsement of an extreme form of 'Deobandism', a new nexus emerged between the ISI, the Army and the Jamait ul Islam. As a result, the ISI came to control one of the largest conglomerates of 'jehadi terrorist organisations' anywhere, providing them with logistics, training and other support. An understanding was also reached with bodies such as the Markaz Dawa ul Irshad and the Lashker e Toiba.

7. The ISI is in a position to indent on radical Islamist networks and use their infrastructure. Other organisations might have conceptualised the idea of a cohesive self sacrificing Islamist vanguard that would by means of an armed struggle create a greater Islamist State, but it was the ISI which provided the sinews, having trained and supported 'volunteers' initially to fight the Soviets and later for 'jehadi' outfits 'waging war' in J&K and the rest of India. The Sunni Islamic connection proved particularly useful, helping to weld together different militant groups in India, such as the SIMI, Ahle Hadis, Al Umma and the Muslim Defence Force. The ISI also adopted a combination of the Shia Sunni doctrine which claims that the true role of an Islamist is to demonstrate Islamic solidarity and actively assist their brothers in arms, no matter where and against which enemy.

8. It will be a mistake if agencies were not to grasp the significance of what this represents viz. that the threat at present is less anchored to specific locations and has a far wider religious sweep. This has caused several independent actions to become merged into a coordinated jehad' against a 'common enemy' in the name of Islam. This has led to the mushrooming of several small cells, comprising disgruntled local muslim youth, to carry out actions under the direction of the ISI. This has enabled unification of hitherto fractured Islamist networks. This has led to the induction of many more members from the professional classes. NGOs purporting to help the Muslim cause have also sprung up, many among them indulging in 'under the horizon' activities. Channelising of funds from various Islamic charities abroad, specially Saudi Arabia and West Asia, has been greatly facilitated.

9. More than anything else, the ISI has managed to transform the character of older established bodies like SIMI and Ahle Hadis. 'Addiction' to 'jehad' among the newer ones has been encouraged through inducements of various kinds. SIMI cells today operate under many different labels, their membership is more varied, their leadership is generally from among those having ISI Pakistan connections. Links have also been firmed up with several Kashmir based militant outfits. Equally pernicious has been the fillip given to the terrorist underworld nexus.

10. Bernard Henri Levy, the French journalist, who investigated the murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan, has catalogued the ISI's deep involvement with Islamic fundamentalist groups and the Al Qeada in addition to its complicity in the killing of Daniel Pearl. Levy's investigation in Pakistan has revealed that it was Omar Sheikh the British born Islamist who was released from an Indian prison at the end of 1999 in exchange for the hostages of a hijacked Indian Airlines plane from Kathmandu who had set up a meeting with Daniel Pearl in a hotel 'controlled, almost managed by the ISI'. He confirms that Omar Sheikh was an integral part of a complex network of Islamist fundamentalist groups, most of which were linked to the ISI and the Al Qeada.

11. It is hardly a matter of speculation nor does it require special intuition to aver that the ISI is at the heart of a web of intrigue that facilitates activities of 'jehadi outfits'. After the elimination of Gazi Baba, Security Agencies cannot afford to rest on their laurels. The ISI and the Al Qeada have a mechanism for almost instantaneous replacement, and 'back up operatives' are usually available. Communications are unlikely to be disrupted since E Mails, chat rooms and web sites are the means by which 'jehadi cells' keep in touch with the ISI. The parallels and similarities between the techniques adopted by the ISI and the Al Qeada should be a warning to all democratic societies. The West, in particular, must refrain from 'supping with the devil' if their intention is to comprehensively defeat terrorism.

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