1. The key question of Sri Lanka's political situation today is whether there exists a genuine desire for peace or the exercise is a chimera not unlike previous occasions like 1987, 1993 and 1995. The initial spark created by the February 2002 cease-fire agreement between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government seems to have been already put out. Much of this is possibly due to the fact that the response from the pro-LTTE Tamil segments to the peace overtures of the Ranil Wickramasinghe Government has been far from satisfactory and this leaves little room for optimism.

2. Peace makers know that preparations for peace nominally start with a mental image of the possible end-result. The needs of the traditional world at times may need to be blended with modernity. Tradition favours effecting changes gradually, while modernity places great store by pluralism and democracy. For the LTTE neither appear to be of little concern, nor do they seem to believe in linking power with principle. In the case of Sri Lanka the added problem is that the main security threat is a derivative of the fault-lines within Sri Lankan Society itself. The decisive clash here is not between civilisations, but within them.

3. It is this mind set that casts an ominous shadow over the negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities. Frustrated perhaps at the lack of progress, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister is now demonstrating greater realism and has declared that he 'expects a very tough task ahead' with more 'deadlocks to cross' and even a 'temporary breakdown' in the talks. The cease- fire agreement has now 'survived' for about 20 month, but it is at best a 'pyrrhic' victory. Indiscriminate violence and human rights violations have hardly ceased. Tamil parties not aligned with the LTTE such as the Eelam Peoples' Democratic Party, the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Front, the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation and the Peoples' Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam continue to be at the receiving end of the LTTE's sustained pogroms. There are few signs of a return to normalcy in LTTE dominated areas of the North East.

4. Six rounds of talks have so far taken place. The end of the first round saw euphoric references to Balasingham's 'elaboration' of the LTTE's commitment to autonomy and autonomy based self-determination. This was perceived as a revision of their original 'maximalist goal' of separation from Sri Lanka. More optimistic forecasts were to follow. The LTTE's presumed agreement to work in Joint Committees along with Government representatives on difficult political issues, and the December 5 Oslo consensus about exploring federal models to find a solution within a united Sri Lanka were the triggers. The Norwegian representative even talked of 'history in the making'.

5. The Sri Lankan Government and the Norwegian interlocutors were hence ill-prepared for the carefully prepared ambush by the LTTE, who suddenly called a halt to the talks on April 21, 2003. They obviously misread the signs, having been lulled by the 'soft image' projected by the LTTE. In his 'Heroes Day' speech (November 27, 2002) Prabhakaran had, however, announced that 'if the right of self-determination is denied and the demand for regional self rule is rejected, there is no alternative other than to secede and form an independent State'. Any one familiar with the LTTE's track record, and the choice of words used on such occasions, would have seen this as a danger signal and as overturning the LTTE's previously stated position of favourably considering a political framework that offered substantial regional autonomy and self-government within an united Sri Lanka.

6. There were other warning signs as well. Throughout the many rounds of talks, the LTTE displayed little interest in discussing substantive issues viz. the quantum of autonomy, federalism, or devolution of powers. Their feigned indifference masked their true intention viz. de facto control of, and not a democratic political solution for, the North East. Then there was the LTTE's insistence that the Government withdraw its forces from the High Security Zones of Jaffna to facilitate re- settlement of displaced Tamils. Third, was the demand for an Interim Administration outside Sri Lanka's Unitary Constitution. The surest sign, however, was the LTTE's boycott of the 55-nation Tokyo Donors Conference which was to pledge around $ 5 billion for the revival of the economy of the Tamil areas. The subsequent sinking of an LTTE ship ferrying arms off Sri Lanka's coast, and the assassination of EPRLF leader, Subathiran, merely set the seal on a fast unraveling situation.

7. The LTTE's demand for 'new thinking' to break the present dead-lock is nothing but an euphemism for further capitulation on the part of a weak-kneed Wickramasinghe Government. Having already set up its own police force, judiciary, and bank in areas under its military control, it now seeks de jure status by having an Interim Administration under its exclusive control. Prabhakaran's inauguration of the headquarters of the 'Tamil Eelam Police Service' in Kilinochchi, as part of a 'permanent administration', thus has more than symbolic significance.

8. The wheel has thus turned a full circle. The talks in Thailand (during 2002-2003) look like a shadow play of the talks held in Thimpu in 1985 under India's auspices to break the LTTE-Sri Lankan Government impasse . The language may be different, but the demands implicitly remain much the same viz. recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct nationality, the North and the East to be recognised as the 'traditional homeland' of the Tamils, and recognition of the Tamils right to self-determination. The LTTE also remains consistent in not discussing substantive political issues, since it does not see 'Eelam' as a 'half-way house'. Neither previously nor now, is the LTTE prepared to compromise on this basic principle.

9. Discerning analysts are convinced that the LTTE did not come to the negotiating table to compromise on its claims to an independent Eelam. It was meant to be a tactic to convince the rest of the world about its democratic bona fides, and thus have the ban imposed upon on it as a terrorist outfit by many countries revoked. The ban had not only damaged its public image, but had put a severe crimp on the raising of funds abroad for pursuing terrorism in Sri Lanka.

10. The LTTE has also been unswerving in its objective of emerging 'as the sole representative of the Tamils'. For this, it is willing to employ unadulterated violence so as to ensure absolute supremacy. Tamil parties such as the EPDP, EROS and PLOTE who oppose this are in grave danger of being decimated. Tamil speaking Muslims in the North are also among the targets of LTTE violence. The clearest proof of the LTTE's determination to continue with terrorism is their public rejection of President Chandrika Kumarathunga's demand for disbanding the 'Black Tigers' - its suicide squad.

11. The US often expresses concern about the security situation in South Asia. It has, however, remained a passive spectator to the depredations of the LTTE - one of the most dangerous terrorist outfits ever. It behoves of the US to utilise the 'coalition of the willing' to effectively deal with the LTTE brand of terrorism. The US cannot afford to turn 'a Nelson's eye' to the high levels of violence here, or the inability of the Norwegian interlocutors to rein in the LTTE. For its part, India must not remain oblivious to the ominous drift in the situation in Northern Sri Lanka. It must seriously consider what options to exercise, both to sustain the integrity of Sri Lanka and curtail the LTTE's terrorist activities, as also to fulfill its responsibility as the dominant power in the region.

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