M.K. NARAYANAN

NEWS WATCH (20/9/2003)

Almost twelve months after the elections in J&K were hailed as 'historic' and six months since Prime Minister Vajpayee's 'proferred hand of friendship' to Pakistan J&K seems to be in a deeper quagmire than before. The Prime Minister is about the only one to retain any enthusiasm for the peace initiative, and in his Independence Day speech from the ramparts of the Delhi Red Fort he again invited Pakistan "to walk together with India on the road to peace".

2. To most others, the Prime Minister's oratory is beginning to look stale. Pakistan refuses to acknowledge the October 2002 Assembly elections as a popular verdict for peace and tranquillity. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamali, misses no opportunity to drive home the point. In his Independence Day speech (August 14) he observed that "Pakistan wants cordial relations with India, but our desire cannot be fulfilled until the oppressed people of J&K get their rights". Pakistan has also flatly rejected External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha's proposal that India and Pakistan cooperate in fighting terrorism.

3. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the success achieved by Security Forces in eliminating leading militants such as Gazi Baba and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan (of the JeM), the ground situation is actually deteriorating. The 'fidayeen' attacks that began with the storming of the Srinagar Radio Station (April 26) on the day the Prime Minister's was making his appeal for peace has not ended. Gun battles between Security Force personnel and militant groups are becoming more prolonged the Doda gun battle in late April went on for a few hours, but the recent one in Kathua carried on for days. Recruitment of Kashmiri youth for training as militants is again becoming evident. Infiltrations remain at a high level. Pro Pakistani militants are even believed to have shifted some of their training camps to locations this side of the LoC.

4. Apart from the Lashker e Toiba, the Jaish e Mohamad, and the Al Badr, the Hizb ul Mujahideen has lately become more active. Under instructions from the JEI Pakistan and its leader Qasi Hussain Ahmed, new militant outfits have emerged, sporting fresh labels. With the assassination of Kuka Parrey, the counter insurgency movement under the aegis of the Jammu Kashmir Awami League which Kuka Parrey had pioneered, appears to be in disarray. A little known militant outfit, Al Nasreen, claims to have carried out the attack, but the reverberations are likely to be more widespread, for the Ikhwan ul Musalmeen consisting mainly of defectors from the ranks of the militants had a key role in battling 'jehadi' terrorism and in the conduct of the elections in 1996 and 2002. Office bearers of the Awami League the political arm of the Ikhwan had become targets of the militants ever since the PDP coalition came to power, and with Kuka Parrey's elimination this kind of counter insurgency initiative is bound to be severely hit.

5. It has become fashionable of late to claim that violence is on the decline. Those familiar with the intrinsic nature of the current wave of violence would confute such claims. The argument that 'normalcy' is returning based on the numbers of tourists frequenting Srinagar and other centres is a flawed one. The situation shows hardly any significant change, with levels of alienation continuing to be high, and anger against the Establishment hardly having diminished. Fear is the dominant imperative and few political leaders including those under state protection feel safe. Many worry that they may be next on the 'hit list' and this extends from Sajjad Lone to Omar Abdullah.

6. Prime Minister Vajpayee has many a time hinted that this may well be the last chance for peace. These past few months, however, it is peace that has been the greatest casualty. The PDP Congress coalition promised much, but Chief Minister, Mufti Mohamad Sayeed's 'culture of healing and social responsibility' has only succeeded in covering up inadequacies with claims of, eventually empty, worthiness. The Chief Minister needs to bring to bear a more focussed approach. The dismantling of the Special Operations Group may have been necessary for the 'healing touch', but the situation seems to be fast unravelling out of control and something different has to be put in its place. What is clearly needed is a radically restructured strategy, involving both Delhi and Srinagar, so as to narrow the gap between what is needed and what the current dispensation in Srinagar is able to offer.

7. Lack of headway in the Vohra round of negotiations with militant groups is highly disappointing. Worse still, is that advantage could not be taken of the rift in Hurriyat ranks, and it is the Islamists, the JEI and Pakistan that has come out trumps. Delhi waffled for too long on holding talks with the Hurriyat, and Pakistan used this to marginalise 'centrists' like Moulvi Abbas Ansari enabling Geelani to take over. Immediately thereafter, Geelani sang his 'siren song' of the need for a trilateral dialogue between India, Pakistan and the people of J&K for resolving the Kashmir dispute.

8. The reality that sponsored terrorism has a dynamic of its own is yet to sink in. Sentiments and emotions play a role in nurturing pernicious movements and shaping them into doctrine. The militants may be bereft of idealism or popular backing, but they have proved capable of fanning the embers of the 'two nation theory'. If Delhi's answer to 'jehadi terrorism' is to hold a high profile meeting of the Inter State Council in Srinagar, then there are a lot of cob webs that need to be removed in the 'corridors of power'. A 'moment of glory' for Mufti Sayeed was a disaster in terms of a strategy.

9. Mufti Sayeed has much to answer for. He has failed in his bid to emerge as the authentic voice of moderate Kashmiris, and against that of pro jehadi and pro Pakistan elements. Neither the 'healing touch' nor projection of personal probity has helped. Populism at the expense of political eclecticism has undermined the appeal of moderation in J&K. The result is that the Islamist fundamentalist construct has become even stronger.

10. Delhi's guilt is no less. Srinagar's 'healing touch' notwithstanding, the terrorists' 'casus belli' still stands a kind of 'moving warfare' over Kashmir. Euphoria over the meetings JUI leader, Fazlur Rehman, had while in India, is totally misplaced. The JUI is a firm believer in the concept of an Islamic State, disdaining a pluralist secular order. The Muttahita Majlis i Amal of which Fazlur Rehman is the Secretary General, is on record that jehad "is the only way to rid Kashmiris of Indian occupation", since UN Resolutions had failed to give them the right to self determination.

11. Delhi hence needs to extricate itself from this mess as early as possible and address the real problems.

The sponsors of terrorism must be made to realise that the territorial status quo cannot be altered through a 'proxy war'.

Reducing alienation in J&K through an imaginative and innovative programme of increasing employment and improving the energy and industrial climate of the State, is the next priority.

Third, is to restore a sense of security and end the present semi anarchy which is creating a fear psychosis.

Fourth, Delhi and Srinagar, should concentrate on establishing some lines of communication with individual militants or terrorist outfits to convert many more of them to the path of peace a la the Kuka Parrey mould.

Fifth, Delhi must impress upon Srinagar the importance of working hard on the humdrum stuff of improving the quality of life at the grass roots level, for any grand vision can succeed only if it is followed up with solid hard work.

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