In the history of global nuclear policy and technological evolutions, the Indian case stands apart, unique because of its incremental approach. It took a quarter century for India to go in for its first atomic test in May 1974 and nearly as long to weaponise, in May 1998. The long cycle of this evolution was, however, coloured with its principled stand against nuclear weaponry in global fora, its emphasis on civilian nuclear development and its strident opposition to international control regimes viewed as discriminatory. India's strategic gain has been its declared nuclear ambiguity since May 1974 that worked very well. Successive Governments used this ploy successfully to shield India from international pressure and it was also a convenient excuse to be indecisive.

The revised assessment of threat perceptions by the BJP (apparently twice, once in March 1996 and again March 1998) provided the primary basis for the weaponisation tests of May 1998. It was an irony of sorts that the previous Gujral Government stated that there was no radical change in India's threats perceptions, but with the change of the domestic political order a new dimension to the external security situation was discovered.

The May 1998 tests moved India from its position of nuclear ambiguity to one of minimum nuclear deterrence. This has been vociferously articulated as a doctrine of defensive posture, an insurance against the fluid global nuclear situation and an effective retaliatory capability for India, should deterrence fail.

rest of the article is at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/05/20/stories/05202524.htm

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